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No one is naive enough to expect that all moral be-
liefs are universal. Today, some countries legally beat
and imprison homosexuals, and others recognize gay
marriage; in some places, killing a bull is a sport, and,
in others, it is an abomination; in some places, corpo-
ral punishment is the obligation of a responsible parent
and, in others, grounds for forced removal. Indeed, the
burden of proof seems to be on the other side: Is there
anything universal about human moral cognition? In
PNAS, Barrett et al. (1) test one candidate for a universal
principle of humanmorality: that an action’s moral value
depends not only on the action’s consequences but on
the person’s intentions.
A cognitive universal is a way of thinking that does
not have to be invented by an individual or a culture,
and does not have to be explicitly transmitted to the
next generation by formal pedagogy. In general,
scientists take two approaches to searching for such
universals. One approach is to measure cognition
before cultural influences are likely to operate, in
young children and infants. The other approach is to
measure cognition across a wide range of cultures,
with a special focus on people in remote groups who
have been least affected by intergroup contact.
Ideally, these two approaches converge: Features
of universal cognition that are observed in preen-
culturation infants are also observed in adults across
a wide range of cultures.
Cognitive universals can be contrasted with “cog-
nitive technologies,” ideas that evolve or are invented,
in one or a few specific places and times, and are
transmitted through explicit teaching and modeling
(2). The prototypical example of a cognitive technol-
ogy is the integer count system. Count lists emerged
independently in some (but not all) human cultures;
through contact between cultures, a small number of
counting systems have become statistically domi-
nant in contemporary humans. Nevertheless, count
systems are clearly technologies, not a cognitive uni-
versal: Specific ways of counting exact set sizes do
not emerge spontaneously in childhood and have
to be transmitted explicitly through both pedagogy
and modeling.
Morality in Early Development
Is the idea that moral evaluations depend on inten-
tions a universal or a technology? Conventional wis-
dom in developmental psychology is consistent with
the cognitive technology view (3). In Europe and North
America, 4-y-old children say that a boy who trips on a
rock and accidentally knocks down a little girl is more
naughty than a second boy who wants to hit the girl but
trips and misses. Only by 7 y old do children clearly
say the second boy was naughty because he intended
harm (4). The developmental shift toward intent-based
moral evaluation is explicitly promoted by parents and
teachers in these cultures: When this scenario happens
in a playground, adults instruct the boy to consider his
sister’s feelings (she feels sad, scared) and the girl to
consider her brother’s intentions (he didn’t see her; it
was an accident). Could the idea of moral evaluations
based on intentions, rather than consequences, be a
specific cultural invention, a cognitive technology like
an integer count list?
On the other hand, recently, some developmental
psychologists have challenged this consensus. Some
aspects of very young children’s spontaneous social
behaviors appear sensitive to others’ intentions. For
example, 4-y-olds spontaneously share stickers with a
puppet who accidentally knocked down their jointly
built tower, but do not share stickers if the puppet
knocked down the tower intentionally (5). Even more
dramatic results come from studies of preverbal babies.
Ten-month-olds reach for a puppet who was un-
knowingly unhelpful to a third character, but do not
reach for a puppet who was knowingly unhelpful (6).
Apparently, some sensitivity to intentions in moral
evaluations emerges spontaneously early in devel-
opment, before enculturation.
Still, it’s unclear how to resolve the conflict between
the traditional experiments (asking for children’s moral
evaluations) and the newer spontaneous measures
used with infants and toddlers. Also, all of the children
in all of these experiments share a cultural context: They
come from families that are exclusively “WEIRD,”—
Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic
(7). If the role of intent in moral evaluation is a cognitive
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universal, it should be present in a wider, more representative
sample of human social environments.
Morality Across Cultural Contexts
Searching for cultural variability in our increasingly interconnected
world requires heroic effort. Barrett et al. (1) assembled a group of
15 researchers from 11 different universities, collaborated to build
a precisely shared protocol that would be culturally appropriate in
all 10 cultural contexts, translated and back-translated the pro-
tocol into nine different languages, and then implemented these
protocols at remote sites all over the globe. At each site, dozens
of informants provided moral evaluations of hypothetical scenar-
ios covering a range of immoral actions (e.g., theft, physical harm,
poisoning the village well) and potentially mitigating factors
(e.g., accident, self-defense). The resulting data are rich and
fascinating, and raise many questions for future research.
In the two “Western” cultures, English-speaking adults in public
areas of a large American city, and Ukrainian-speaking adults in the
rural mountain village of Storozhnitsa, moral evaluations are highly
sensitive to intentions. For example, theft (Alex taking Bob’s bag) is
judged to be very bad if done intentionally (Alex noticed where Bob
placed his bag) or with motivation (Alex saw expensive jewelry in
Bob’s bag), but not if the “theft”was done accidentally (Alex meant
to pick up his own very similar bag) or without motivation (Alex saw
some cheap lettuce in Bob’s bag).
By contrast, Himba adults in the Omuhonga Basin of Namibia
report that, even if done accidentally or without motivation, taking
the bag is almost as bad as motivated intentional theft. Sursurunga-
speaking adults from coastal villages in New Ireland, Papua
New Guinea, report that taking the bag should be punished
equally, whether intentional or not. The most extreme difference
from the “Western” groups, in this sample, is observed in the
adults from Yasawa Island in Fiji. With striking consistency, in-
dividuals from this group treat intentions as irrelevant: Theft,
punching someone in the face, and poisoning the village
well are all wrong, bad for one’s reputation, and punishable,
regardless of the knowledge or motivations of the person.
The use of intentions in moral evaluations clearly varies across
cultures, but do these results show that moral evaluation based on
intentions is a cognitive technology? A deeper look at the same
data suggests the opposite.
Consider the adults from Yasawa Island. Their moral evalua-
tions of accidents and intentional harms are the same. The cog-
nitive technology view suggests that the Yasawa have not evolved
or acquired the idea of moral evaluation based on intentions.
However, there are many good reasons to reject this interpreta-
tion. First, the Yasawa informants unambiguously identify the in-
tentional versus accidental actions, when asked directly. Second,
many cultural groups, including the Yasawa, have an explicitly
transmitted cultural norm that it is inappropriate, an invasion of
privacy, and even a punishable offense to speculate about an-
other person’s thoughts and feelings. Yasawa adults’ public
evaluations of these scenarios are thus congruent with their ex-
plicit norm about appropriate public discourse, but may diverge
from their private cognitions (8).
Third, Yasawa adults do evaluate actions based on the
person’s knowledge, as is apparent by contrasting another pair
of scenarios in this experiment’s amazingly rich protocol. First,
consider Clark, who believes that David is attacking his (Clark’s)
son; racing over, Clark punches David in the face, knocking him
down, only to discover that David and the son were just play-
fighting. Compare that story with Ethan, who sees a dangerous
fire start in the market; racing to put the fire out, Ethan punches
Fred (who is blocking the way), knocking him down, but, by the
time he arrives, someone else has put out the fire. [Barrett et al. (1)
call Ethan a case of “necessity,” but, in the scenario, the harm was
actually unnecessary; cases like this are often called “foreseen
side-effects” (9).] Clark’s and Ethan’s actions seem elegantly par-
allel, but, in nearly every society, including the Yasawa and ex-
cepting only Los Angeles, Clark’s action is seen as much more
morally wrong than Ethan’s. Why?
Clark’s punch was a mistake based on a false belief (his son was
not in danger). By contrast, Ethan’s punch was based on a true
belief [there was a fire (10)] and reflects a deliberate choice to do a
harmful action as a means to a greater good (11). Relatedly, Clark
In PNAS, Barrett et al. test one candidate for a
universal principle of human morality: that an
action’s moral value depends not only on the
action’s consequences but on the person’s
intentions.
and Ethan differ in what they should have known: Clark probably
should have known that David was just pretending, but it’s less
obvious that Ethan should have known that someone else would
put out the fire. If this kind of reasoning explains why the Yasawa
(and adults from most cultural groups) evaluate Clark’s punch as
punishable but Ethan’s punch as praiseworthy, then it seems clear
that Yasawa adults, too, engage in subtle and sophisticated
consideration of a person’s beliefs and knowledge when making
moral evaluations.
Convergence of Two Approaches
Taken together, developmental and cross-cultural evidence ap-
pear to be converging on a striking picture of universal moral
cognition. No matter where you go in the world, from fishing
villages of Fiji to mountain towns in Western Ukraine, human
adults make moral evaluations of one another’s actions, judging
some actions to be wrong, punishable, and bad for one’s repu-
tation, and judging other actions to be neutral or praiseworthy.
Nowhere in the world are these evaluations based exclusively on
the harm caused to the victim. Adults in every culture recognize
the importance of an action’s context: Punching and injuring the
victim is very wrong if unprovoked but not wrong at all if the punch
occurred in self-defense against the victim’s knife attack. The
same punch is also not blameworthy if it was committed as a
means to achieve a larger good (putting out a dangerous fire),
even if the good outcome did not actually occur. In addition,
people from all cultures recognize that some actions’ conse-
quences were not desired or intended, including accidents (trip-
ping) and mistakes (false beliefs). Even infants and young children
spontaneously distinguish between accidents, mistakes, and in-
tentionally harmful acts. Recognizing and evaluating actions in
terms of a person’s desires, goals, knowledge, and control is a
stunningly sophisticated human cognitive universal.
At the same time, the moral status of accidents and mistakes
varies substantially, both across cultures and within cultures
across action contexts [e.g., theft, ingesting taboo substances,
sex with forbidden partners (12)]. At one extreme, a justified
mistake may be evaluated as entirely blameless; at the opposite
extreme, a false belief or uncontrolled movement may itself
be blameworthy. One reason for this variation may be that in-
dividuals and groups have different views about what a person
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could control or ought to know. Barrett et al. (1) acknowledge
that they cannot explain the observed pattern of variation in the
status of actions and mistakes, across cultures and contexts;
devising and testing potential explanations will be a key chal-
lenge for future research.
Even if developmental and cross-cultural approaches con-
verge on cognitive universals, however, we must be wary of con-
flating the two. When children differ from adults, it is usually
because they (children) have not developed or learned a concept
or technology that we (adults) have mastered. When adults from
different cultures differ from one another, however, we (Western
scientists) must resist slipping into an analogous interpretation.
Indeed, an intriguing hypothesis is that the most impressive cog-
nitive technology revealed by this experiment is one we (West-
erners) conspicuously lack: the ability to resist evaluating actions
based on intentions. The best strategy for shaping future social
behavior may be to react only to consequences (13). Blaming a
boy for knocking his sister down, whether or not he intended to do
it, may be the most effective way to teach him to be more careful
the next time.
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